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DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
This has likewise been the meaning given to the words 'as-
sessed value' by the leading text authorities. In speaking of
debt limitation, 15 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3rd.
ed. 1949) states (page 311) : 'The standard is generally the
assessed value of the property for taxation rather than the
actual value, where the two are different; . . .,25
It is interesting to note that the remainder of this quotation is also
significant:
; but where the Constitution or statute uses the term
'actual value' such value governs rather than the taxable
value. 2 6
The Supreme Court's dismay at the prospect of having a double
standard of assessment, one test for borrowing and another for tax-
ation, is unfounded. The Legislature has simply attempted to raise
the borrowing capacity of municipalities to its proper level without
compelling assessors to assess at market value. Actually, there is no
need for assessed value for taxation and assessed value for borrowing
to be correlated.
This decision compels us to conclude that the framers of the Con-
stitution, knowing that the law required assessors to assess at market
value, decided to sanction an illegal practice, and make this practice
the guide for determining the borrowing capacity of municipalities
throughout the State. This is a bizarre conclusion and one that does
not speak highly of the framers of our Constitution. Surely, they did
not intend to give such power to assessors at the expense of the
Legislature.
PATENTS - Patentability of Combinations - Unobvious Subject Mat-
ter Under 35 U.S.C. § 103.-Unobvious results are evidence of patenta-
bility in a combination but unexpected results which are inherent from
an obvious structure do not satisfy this requirement.
In Re Alford, 300 F.2d 929, 133 U.S.P.Q. 281 (C.C.P.A. 1962);
certiorari denied, 83 S. Ct. 255.
Applicant claimed a disc-type coaxial cable choke couple for con-
necting two coaxial cable sections to transmit electrical energy there-
between at high frequencies with slight energy leakage. The Patent
25. Id. at 126, 127, 182 A.2d 504.
26. 15 McQUILLIN, MJNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1949), at 311.
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Office rejected applicant's claims on the grounds that the structure
would be obvious to one skilled in the particular art involved in view
of cited patents, notwithstanding applicant's unrefuted contention
that new and unobvious results were obtained by the claimed struc-
ture. On appeal to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, held,
affirmed; while the unobviousness of the result is evidence of patent-
ability, it is insufficient to support a patent where an obvious com-
bination of prior art disclosures would provide the unobvious result. 1
The issue in this decision involved the interpretation of the first
sentence of section 103 of the Patent Act of 19522 which establishes
a standard of patentability. This part of section 103 was intended
as a codification of prior case law3 with the objective that an express
statement of a condition for patentability would have a stabilizing
effect upon subseqent adjudications concerning that issue.4 While
this objective is extremely desirable, the prior case law, allegedly
codified, had sufficiently varied in expressing a criteria for patent-
ability that divergent interpretations of section 103 can be supported.
The language of section 103 is similar to that used in the landmark
case of Hotchkiss v. Greenwood5 which set forth the requirement
that something in addition to novelty was necessary to bestow
patentability on a combination of old elements.6 While the court
did not use the term "obvious" nor expressly state that results were
to be considered, it did approvingly cite English authorities which
had held that the amount of invention may be estimated from the
result, although not capable of being directly estimated on a view
1. 300 F.2d 929, 933. Dissenting opinions of Judges Rich and Smith took issue
with the majority's conclusion that an obvious structure could not be patentable
notwithstanding unexpected results.
2. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1958). Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject
matter. A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically
disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that
the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention
was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject mat-
ter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the
invention was made.
3. Reviser's Note, 35 U.S.C.A. § 103 (1954).
4. Ibid.
5. 11 How. 248 (1850).
6. Id. at 267. In the words of the court, "for unless more ingenuity and skill
in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required
in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than possessed by an ordi-
nary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absence of that de-
gree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every inven-
tion."
1963]
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of the invention itself. 7 Considering the case as a whole, it appears
to support a standard of patentability which considers results as
well as structure.
In Loom Co. v. Higgins8 the Supreme Court adopted a similar phi-
losophy and indicated that a new combination of known devices
producing a new and useful result evidenced invention, but that
invention is negatived if the combination would be obvious to any
mechanic skilled in the art for attaining the advantages proposed.9
This doctrine was cited approvingly in such famous cases as The
Barbed Wire Patent10 and Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford," where
patentability was sustained in each case on the basis of new and
beneficial results.
An apparently contrary doctrine was set forth in a process case12
of that same era, however, as it was held that patentability did not
lie in the application of an old process to a new use even though the
results were better than expected. 1 3 Although in a subsequent
case, 1 4 patentability was sustained upon a minor change in one of
the process variables insomuch as a long-sought result was
achieved. 15
A different treatment of the importance of the results achieved by a
new combination of old elements occurred in the controversial case
of Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp.'1 where
patentability was denied as the result claimed as new was the same in
character as the original result, notwithstanding the fact that the new
result had not before been contemplated.' 7 This holding was cited
7. Id. at 256. Webster Patent Cases 409. The court quoted Mr. Webster say-
Ing, "whenever the change and its consequences taken together and viewed as a
sum, are considerable, there must be a sufficiency of invention to support a
patent."
8. 105 U.S. 580 (1882).
9. Id. at 591. (Emphasis added.)
10. 143 U.S. 275 (1892).
11. 214 U.S. 366 (1909).
12. Lovell Manufacturing Co. v. Cary, 147 U.S. 623 (1893).
13. Id. at 634.
14. Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45 (1923).
15. Id. at 67, 68. The process variable changed was the pitch of the travelling
screen of a Fourdrinier machine. The pitch had been altered previously, how-
ever the patentee changed the pitch to a degree not before tried and achieved
unexpected results.
16. 314 U.S. 84 (1941). This case advocated the "flash of genius test" which,
since Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb, 224 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1955), has not been followed.
Also, see Reviser's Note, 35 U.S.C.A. § 103 (1954).
17. Id. at 91. For comments on this case see, e.g., 24 J.PAT.OFF.SOC'Y 32
(1942), 24 J.PAT.OFF.SOC'Y 371 (1942) and 25 J.PAT.OFF.SOC'Y 678 (1942).
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approvingly in the Great A & P Co. v. Supermarket'8 case where
the court held unpatentable a simple mechanical device because no
new function or operation was achieved by that aggregation of old
elements. 19
The lower courts, following the lead of the Supreme Court, have had
much difficulty in applying a uniform test for patentability. Prior
to the enactment of section 103 of the Patent Act of 1952, the lower
courts frequently looked for an inventive act, disregarding unexpected
results. In a 1936 case 2 0 the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
did not consider an unexpected result in denying patentability because
anyone skilled in the art would have performed the experiment. A
later case 2 ' similarly dismissed unexpected results in holding that
the substitution of one element for another would be obvious as this
substitution had been successfully effected in other applications. The
court in reaching this conclusion cited J. Learned Hand's comments
from the Reuben Condenser Case,2 2 "But all combinations are not
patentable combinations. Especially in electrical and chemical ex-
periments happy solutions may be reached by testing out variants
reached merely by permutations of old elements." 2 3 During this
same era the Seventh Circuit 2 4 held that invention could not be
achieved by including an element which would inherently accomplish
applicant's purpose, whether such end was realized or whether it was
18. 340 U.S. 147 (1950). The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas is of
interest as he sets forth inventive genius as the test of patentability, stating
further, "The Constitution never sanctioned the patenting of gadgets. Patents
serve a higher end-the advancement of science. An invention need not be as
startling as an atomic bomb to be patentable. But it has to be of such quality
and distinction that masters of the scientific field in which it falls will recognize
it as an advance."
19. Id. at 151. At. 152 the court recognized that elements in chemistry or
electronics may take on some new quality or function from being brought into
concert, but that this was not the usual result of uniting elements old in mechan-
ics.
20. In Re Gauerke, 86 F.2d 330 (C.C.P.A. 1936).
21. Radtke v. Coe, 122 F.2d 937 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
22. 85 F.2d 537, 541 (2d Cir. 1936).
23. Compare with another statement of J. Hand, "Substantially all inven-
tions are combinations of old elements, what counts is the selection, out of all their
possible permutations, of that combination which will be serviceable." Safety
Car Heating & Lighting Co. v. General Electric, 155 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1946).
24. McIvaine v. Walgreen, 138 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1943).
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intended. 25 A similar doctrine was espoused in subsequent cases 26
such as a 1952 Court of Customs and Patent Appeals case2 7 which
held that better results were immaterial if no invention was required
to make the changes responsible for such improvement.
In contrast with above, other lower court decisions prior to 1952
reposed more weight upon the results.28 One such case 2 9 held that
the assembling into a new article a number of good features of the
prior art may involve invention and be of such utility and produce
such unexpected results as to be patentable.
It was against a background of cases such as those cited above, with
their various formulas for patentability, that section 103 was intended
as a codification to impart stability to this area of the law.3 0 Sub-
sequent cases indicate that the desired effect was not achieved.
Certain cases sustain patentability upon the existence of unexpected
results 3 1 while others appear to require an inventive act.3 2
A further indication of the confusion yet residing in this area is
in the instant case 33 where both the majority opinion 34 and J.
Smith's dissenting opinion3 5 cite Loom Co. v. Higgin836 in support
of their divergent contentions. The majority of the court while
acknowledging the existence of unexpected results denied patent-
ability insomuch as they concluded that it would be obvious for a
person skilled in the art of electronics to test the claimed device.
25. Id. at 179. The court cited In Re Smith, 262 Fed. 717 (C.C.P.A. 1920)
wherein a patent was denied for a construction wholly disclosed in a prior patent
which would inherently accomplish applicant's purpose.
26. See, e.g., In Re Stover, 146 F.2d 299 (C.C.P.A. 1944); In Re Casey, 165
F.2d 1019 (C.C.P.A. 1948); General Bronze v. Cupples, 189 F.2d 154 (8th Cir.
1951) and In Re Drisch, 189 F.2d 994 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
27. In Re Schwartz, 195 F.2d 327 (C.C.P.A. 1952).
28. In Re Cordes, 76 F.2d 302 (C.C.P.A. 1935); Traitel Marble Co. v. Hunger-
ford Brass & Copper Co., 18 F.2d 66 (2d Cir. 1927).
29. In Re Holt, 162 F.2d 472 (C.C.P.A. 1947).
30. See notes 3 and 4 supra and accompanying text.
31. See e.g., Blaw-Knox Co. v. Lain Co., 230 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1956). Appli-
cation of Shaffer, 229 F.2d 476 (C.C.P.A. 1956) and In Re Conover, 304 F.2d 680
(C.C.P.A. 1962).
32. See, e.g., Mills v. Watson, 223 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Emerson v. Na-
tional Cylinder Gas Co., 251 F.2d 152 (1st Cir. 1958); In Re Paul, 252 F.2d 306
(C.C.P.A. 1958); Gentzel v. Manning, 230 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1956) and In Re
Busch, 251 F.2d 617 (C.C.P.A. 1958).
33. In Re Alford, 300 F.2d 929 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
34. Id. at 932.
35. Id. at 937.
36. Supra note 8.
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The dissenting opinions of J. Rich and J. Smith attack the majority
for their casual dismissal of the unexpected results achieved by
applicant's combination. 3 7 J. Smith concluded that applicant's con-
ception compromised a combination having improved properties, i.e.
less energy leakage, and, therefore, it was not obvious from the prior
art as the prior art did not even hint that improved properties might
result.
It is submitted that the decision in the instant case does not apply
the doctrine of Loom Co. v. Higgins notwithstanding its citation by
the majority. that doctrine laid emphasis upon the results at-
tained, 38 while the instant case does not. This decision would in-
terpret section 103 to deny patentability to combinations which pos-
sessed an obvious structure, regardless of the results achieved. How-
ever, it is submitted that section 103 should be interpreted as
negating patentability only when each element of the subject matter,
i.e. structure and result, is obvious, and that patentability be sus-
tained if either is found to be unobvious.
The Supreme Court in denying applicant's petition for certiorari 3 9
has failed to avail itself of an opportunity to clarify this confusing
area of the law.4 0
37. J. Rich stated at 934, "Viewed by hindsight, and as a mere mechanical
construction, the new combination may appear to be a slight change and one
which would perhaps be of no significance to the art but for the fact that it pro-
duces advantageous results which the prior art does not suggest could be achieved
by the change made."
38. See note 9 and accompanying text, especially the phrase "for attaining
the advantages proposed."
39. 31 LW 3171 (Nov. 20, 1962). To date the Supreme Court has not inter-
preted § 103 of the Patent Act of 1952.
40. See Comment, Patents-The Changing Standard of Patenable Inven-
tions: Confusion Compounded, 55 MICH. L. REV. 985 (1957).
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